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Ina 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 693 
A.2d 749 (1997), held that when a 
police officer frisked the outer 
clothing of a suspect and detected 
no weapons, a secondary, more· 
intrusive search was 
unreasonable and violated the 
suspect's Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
On May 22, 1994, Baltimore 
City Police Officer Sean White 
responded to a call involving 
individuals selling drugs and firing 
weapons on a street corner. 
Officer White observed four to five 
men on the corner, none of whom 
fit the description of the individual 
suspected of firing the weapon. 
Officer White did, however, 
observe the respondent, William 
L. Smith ("Smith"), place an 
unidentifiable object in the back 
waistband of his pants. Based on 
Officer White's experience and the 
nature of the call, he believed the 
object was a handgun. Officer 
White detained Smith and 
conducted an initial protective frisk 
for weapons which revealed 
nothing. Although Officer White 
had patted-down the back 
waistband of Smith in his original 
search, he double checked his 
search by pulling Smith's shirt out 
to see whether he had missed a 
weapon. Upon pulling out Smith's 
shirt, a plastic bag containing 
cocaine fell out. 
The Circuit Court of Maryland 
for Baltimore City denied Smith's 
motion to suppress the cocaine on 
the grounds that lifting Smith's 
shirt was within the permissible 
scope of a protective search for 
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weapons. Smith was convicted of 
possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
decision and held that the circuit 
court improperly denied Smith's 
motion to suppress the cocaine 
because Officer White exceeded 
the lawful bounds of a proper 
protective frisk when he double 
checked his original pat-down. 
Certiorari was granted and the 
sole issue before the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland was whether 
a police officer could further verify 
that a suspect was not armed 
after an initial pat-down revealed 
no weapons. 
Because this case involved a 
frisk for weapons in the absence 
of probable cause to arrest, the 
court reviewed and incorporated 
into its decision the principles 
established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). Smith at 464,693 
A.2d at 751. In Terry, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a 
police officer may briefly detain 
and conduct a "carefully limited" 
frisk of a suspect's outer clothing 
if the facts support an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect is involved in criminal 
activity and may be armed. Id. at 
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465, 693 A.2d· at 751. The 
Supreme Court noted that the 
purpose of a Terry frisk is to 
ensure the safety of the police 
officer as well as bystanders, but 
it is not an evidence-gathering 
search. Id. The Supreme Court 
further determined that a police 
officer should limit the search to 
what is minimally necessary to 
balance the competing interests of 
the officer's self-protection and the 
individual's Fourth Amendment 
rights. Id. at 465-66, 693 A.2d at 
751. 
Although a pat-down frisk 
alone is an acceptable intrusion, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has· recognized, as have other 
courts, that under certain circum-
stances, a more intrusive search 
may be necessary. Id. at 466, 
693 A.2d at 751. In situations 
where the suspect refuses to obey 
the officer's commands or where 
there are other exigent 
circumstances the officer may 
dispense with the pat-down and 
proceed with a more intrusive 
search. Id. at 466-68, 693 A.2d at 
751-52. However, a police officer 
may not immediately dispense 
with a pat-down frisk and proceed 
with a more intrusive search 
unless the officer is prevented 
from conducting an effective pat-
down search. Id. at 466, 693 A.2d 
at 752 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, A Treatise on 
the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(b) at 
272 (3d ed. 1996)). 
In completing its review of 
Terry, the court of appeals 
concluded that a police officer 
must use the least intrusive 
means of discovering concealed 
weapons to balance the 
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competing interests of officer 
safety and a suspect's 
constitutional rights. Id. at 468, 
693 A.2d at 753. However, the 
court next reviewed the 
circumstances which prompted 
the secondary search and 
determined that Officer White 
exceeded the permissible scope 
of a Terry search. Id. at 470-71, 
693 A.2d at 754. 
The court conceded that 
Officer White had a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Smith 
was armed and therefore was 
justified in conducting a "minimally 
intrusive" frisk. Id. at 462, 693 
A.2d at 753. However, when the 
pat-down revealed no weapons, 
the risk of harm to the officer no 
longer outweighed the suspect's 
competing interest against 
unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Id. at 469, 693 A.2d at 
753. The court concluded that 
"when Officer White failed to 
detect a weapon-like object, his 
frisk of Smith should have 
ceased." Id. at 470, 693 A.2d at 
754. Therefore, because the 
cocaine was the fruit of the illegal 
search, the court deemed it 
inadmissible. Id. at 472, 693 A.2d 
at 754. 
In the dissenting opinion, 
Judge Raker acknowledged that 
an officer's right to conduct a 
Terry frisk has limitations and not 
every frisk justifies a more 
intrusive search beyond the 
suspect's outer clothing. Id. at 
474, 693 A.2d at 755. However, 
based on Officer White's 
experience and the nature of the 
call, she found that Officer White 
was justified in conducting the 
secondary, "limited intrusion," 
when the original pat-down did not 
satisfy his reasonable fear that 
Smith was armed. Id. at 474,693 
A.2d at 755. Judge Raker 
reasoned that it does not 
necessarily follow that there is 
less risk after a standard Terry 
frisk, particularly if an experienced 
officer such as Officer White had a 
continued suspicion that a weapon 
was present despite the negative 
pat-down. Id. at 473, 693 A.2d at 
755. 
The close decision in State v. 
Smith, which could have easily 
weakened Terry in Maryland, 
reflects the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the 
competing interests of officer 
safety and a suspect's 
constitutional rights. Because 
non-arrest searches involve swift 
action based upon on-the-spot 
observations by the police officer, 
each step of the search process 
must be independently justified. 
To allow the secondary search in 
the case at bar would entitle police 
officers to conduct evidence 
gathering searches in virtually any 
situation in the name of officer 
safety. Although officer safety is 
an essential and necessary 
concern, it should not be used as 
a justification to conduct multiple 
searches of a suspect when no 
weapons were detected in the 
initial search. Respect for a 
suspect's constitutional guarantee 
against unreasonable searches 
and seizures is paramount when 
the initial frisk uncovers no 
weapons. 
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